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Abstract 
 
Assuming that the European Community has become a world actor in the field of 
external economic relations, is the European Union now to be considered, by way of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence 
Policy, as an actor in the field of (classical) foreign policy? The answer is that we are 
facing an evolving process with important and perhaps enduring specificities of the 
two facets of EU relations with the outside world. The following questions are 
addressed: What are the main features and the practical developments in the two 
fields? What is important, in this perspective, for the external action of the Union in 
the Constitutional Treaty of 2004? Should we define the EU as a civilian power? What 
is “European” in the European Security Strategy of December 2003? 
 Jean-Victor Louis 
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Introduction1 
 
The suspense inherent to the question mark in the title "The European Union: from 
external relations to foreign policy?" is not comparable to the one offered by a 
thriller, either a film or a novel. Indeed (mostly) external economic relations as 
organised by the EC Treaty are part of foreign policy, including the classical, more 
“political” fields of foreign and security policy. 
 
The distinction between low and high politics, that is external economic relations 
focusing mainly on trade and development but also on transport, fisheries, 
environment etc., and classical diplomacy, including the possible use of force, still 
has some justification but everybody agrees that it is a relative one. When the EU 
enters into negotiations with Russia for gas supply, is it low or high politics? Are the 
negotiations within the Doha Round in the WTO low or high politics?  
 
Why is it that foreign policy analysts express such an intense interest for the nature 
and development of the foreign policy of the European Union? It obviously derives 
from the fact that in the family of international organisations, the EU/EC has a very 
special place. It is clearly not a state but it is not a classical international organisation 
either. Questions about, for example, treaty-making power of other international 
organisations, universal or regional, are mostly of a technical nature. The relations of 
the EU with the rest of the world are the projection and, in a way, the barometer of 
an original process of integration among states and peoples, which contrary to what 
happens in federations still preserves the international existence and legal capacity 
of its member states.  
 
The European Community has started and developed as a unique experiment. 
Cremona uses the rather neutral expression of a “regional integration arrangement” 
to characterise the Union and she stresses that it has served as a model in other 
continents.2 The role of law in this model is predominant. As Walter Hallstein, the first 
president of the EEC Commission, stated in 1965, the Community, based on law, has 
                                                 
1   This paper is a revised version of the Inaugural Lecture of the Jean Monnet Chair at the 
Department of Economics, Free University of Bolzano, 9 November 2006. 
2    See Marise Cremona, “The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity”, 41 
CMLRev. 2004, pp. 553-573. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
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law as its main instrument.3 It means that contrary to states, it does not benefit from 
the so-called monopoly of legitimate constraint on its territory. It has no police and 
no army of its own and it relies on law in order to achieve its objectives. It 
consequently has built a legal order; it promotes the rule of law to a degree 
unknown in other international organisations; it develops democracy in its internal 
structure; it naturally projects its values in its relations with other states and 
international organisations; and it works as a “stabiliser” especially for its neighbours.4  
 
A Community of values, it is also a Community of interests with a population of half a 
billion people, a GDP of approximately a quarter of the world’s GDP and a total of 
20 percent of world imports and exports. When the EU/EC participates in 
(multilateral) negotiations, it automatically is one of the two or three most important 
players. The EU acts as the “engine of the multilateral system”.5 It inevitably influences 
its neighbours and the states in its periphery; it is a “market player”.6 And as the 
Commission observes, the EU has become a “key” and a “world” player.7 Javier 
Solana, in an inspired formula, declared in 2005 that “everywhere in the world I hear 
a need for Europe”.8  
 
But the (economic) external relations of the EC are, as a matter of principle, 
separate from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the Union under the present legal situation (i.e. 
under the Treaties as modified by the Treaty of Nice). The so-called “pillar system” 
finds its origins in an historical process of which I will recall the main stages up to the 
Constitutional Treaty. I will have a quick look at the different legal regimes of the two 
facets of foreign policy. Thereafter I will refer to the description made and the 
qualifications given to foreign policy and try to confront foreign policy analysis, law 
and politics in this debate. I will look at what is typically “European” in the foreign 
policy. I will conclude by some considerations on enlargement and foreign policy.  
 
                                                 
3   Parlement européen, Débats, 17 juin 1965, p. 220. 
4   Cremona, op.cit., pp. 558ff. 
5   Mario Telò, EU, Global Governance, World Order, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 58-64. 
6   Cremona, op.cit., pp. 555ff. 
7    European Commission, "A World Player. The European Union’s External Relations", 
ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/47/index_en.htm (28 September 2006). 
8   Javier Solana, Discours, Paris, 18 avril 2005 (author's translation). Jean-Victor Louis 
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From the Rome Treaty to the Constitutional Treaty 
 
The Treaty of Rome, concluded fifty years ago, endowed the EEC with an 
international legal capacity that, gives it the competence to conclude international 
agreements. The treaty expressly provides for tariffs and trade policy, association 
agreements with European countries as a preliminary stage before accession and 
the association of colonies (mostly African ones) soon to be independent. This 
resulted in the conclusion of agreements with a number of countries in different parts 
of the world (ACP and bilateral agreements).  
 
Thanks to the progressive case law of the Court of Justice, the EC developed implied 
powers in the international field (famous ERTA judgment of 1971). 
 
The EC has concluded hundreds of bi- or multilateral agreements, many of them 
jointly with its member states (so-called mixed agreements) when these agreements 
exceeded in some parts or were thought to exceed the international competence 
of the EC. 
 
In 1969, the December summit decided a “relance” of the EEC, which included the 
will to progress on the way to a political union and to launch the so-called “political 
cooperation” in the field of foreign policy, starting on a purely informal basis with the 
creation of a committee of ambassadors for consultation and coordination. The 
Single European Act of 1986 included a chapter (article 30) on Political Cooperation 
but this intergovernmental process remained separate from the Community. It 
received a permanent secretariat.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introduced the so-called pillar system. The Community 
pillar, the second pillar which included the very ambitiously defined CFSP, without 
introducing qualitative differences to the former political cooperation, and the third 
pillar on Justice and Home Affairs. The Commission and the Court had very limited to 
non-existent powers in the second and third pillars, the European Parliament was only 
to be kept informed and unanimity was the rule in the Council.  
 
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty introduced some important novelties. It broke up the 
third pillar, “communitarised” some aspects, introduced a bridge clause and EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
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recognised a possibility of intervention of the Court of Justice in the field of 
cooperation in criminal and police affairs which remained in the third pillar. It 
created the function of High Representative for the CFSP and introduced an article 
24 (made applicable by article 38 in the third pillar) which provided treaty-making 
power for the entire field of CFSP.  
 
The 2000 Treaty of Nice brought some modifications in the second pillar. It 
recognised in particular the existence and the functions of a Political and Security 
Committee (article 25) and mentioned the ESDP, which has developed since the St 
Malo French-British Declaration of 1998 in parallel with the Treaty provisions.  
 
The Constitutional Treaty includes important modifications such as the creation of the 
post of a Foreign Minister who would at the same time be Vice-President of the 
Commission, of a President of the European Council appointed for a renewable 
mandate of two years-and-a-half with, in particular, a representative function, and a 
joint external service. Article I-3 states the objectives of external action, and its 
principles are defined in article III-292, which covers all the aspects of external action 
in the “Community” and the CFSP/ESDP. Even if the intention was to remove the 
pillars, the CFSP/ESDP still present specificities such as the limited role of the 
Commission and the Court of Justice as well as of the Parliament and the 
importance of unanimity in the decision-making process of the Council.  
 
So, on the one hand, there are external relations where the role of the Commission 
and the Court is important, the prerogatives of the European Parliament 
progressively increasing, and majority voting within the Council the rule. On the other 
hand, there is what has been considered as a separate category of competences9 
that is due to remain specific and separate from the first pillar, although there are 
bridges between the two, especially in the civil management of crises. The 
development of a complementarity between the two external fields of action can 
be observed. An official French document of August 2006, entitled “Guide de la 
PESC”, gives the following examples: the improved EU capability of confronting 
emergency situations, crises and catastrophes, the exchange of staff between the 
Commission and the Council secretariat, a unified representation of the Union 
                                                 
9   As far as the situation in the Constitutional Treaty is concerned, see "L’action extérieure de 
l’Union", by Barbara Delcourt, in Commentaire de la Constitution européenne, edited by 
M. Dony and E. Bribosia, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2005, pp. 355ff.  Jean-Victor Louis 
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through the merging of the functions of special representative of the Union and the 
delegate of the Commission, a more active and better coordinated communication 
policy that gives greater visibility to the whole of external action.10  
 
If there are bridges between the first and the second pillars, foreign policy is also 
concerned with external aspects of internal security, the province of the third pillar. 
As a matter of fact, trans-pillar actions have been conducted by international 
agreements concerning police and judicial cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism.  
 
The CFSP is not a common policy like the common commercial policy, based on an 
exclusive competence of the Community. There is not a “single” foreign policy at the 
level of the Union but it has evolved from a mere “declaratory” policy, that is, a series 
of common positions expressed by the Council or the European Council on many 
aspects of the international situation, to a more active policy through common 
operations including the possibility of the use of force if needed (the so-called 
Petersberg operations of which an updated list figures in article III-309 of the 
Constitutional Treaty). Javier Solana described the twelve crisis management 
operations in which the Union was involved in September 2006: “From Bosnia to 
Moldova and soon Kosovo in Europe, from Darfur to Congo in Africa, from Gaza to 
Iraq in the Middle East and in Aceh in Asia. We have also nine so-called EU Special 
Representatives, which are senior ambassadors working on some of the world’s most 
pressing regional conflicts. Being present on the ground has helped to address our 
Achilles Heel: our inability to translate our large sums of money into political influence. 
It has also lead to a more serious mindset and the beginning of a common strategic 
culture.”11 
 
Political Science Analysis of European Foreign Policy, Law and Politics 
 
The specificity of the Union’s position on the international scene has attracted a lot of 
interest on the part of specialists of international relations. They have attempted to 
                                                 
10    Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Guide de la PESC, p. 7, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr, (28 
September 2006).  
11   See Javier Solana, “Europe’s answers to the global challenges”, University of 
Copenhagen, 8 September 2006, S245/06. On the intervention of the EU in civil crisis 
management see various authors, “Civilian crisis management: the EU way”, ISS, Chaillot 
Paper, no. 90, June 2006.  EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
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integrate European foreign policy in a model of international actor: the “civilian 
power”, and they have described the complexity of it by defining it as a “system”. I 
will first make some references to this literature and then propose some critical 
comments. 
 
The Row about the Union as a Civilian Power 
The controversy on the nature of the Union (Community) in its relations to the world 
has been on the agenda since a famous article by François Duchêne in 1972,12 and 
the debate has since then expanded into a multitude of scholarly contributions, 
especially by British, American and German political scientists.13 François Duchêne 
coined his definition with regard to the EC but the concept of civilian power was also 
used for Japan or Germany, two countries with limitations on their military forces.  
 
The most radical vision of the “ideal type” of civilian power has been exposed by 
Karen Smith.14 She proposes the following definition: “A civilian power is an actor 
which uses civilian means for persuasion, to pursue civilian ends, and whose foreign 
policy-making process is subject to democratic control or public scrutiny: all four 
elements are important.”15  
 
There are various particularly important points in such a definition: first, both the 
means and the objectives are due to be “civilian”, and the means precede the aims 
in the definition. Second, civilian is associated with persuasion which is opposed to 
coercion. Third, civilian is linked with democratic control and public scrutiny, another 
way of expressing both the legitimacy and accountability of the actors. One also 
could express reservations to the use of the word “power” that recalls for some the 
                                                 
12   François Duchêne, “Europe’s role in world peace”, in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe 
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London, Fontana, 1972, pp. 32-47. 
13   See, among others, Christopher Hill, “The Capacity-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising 
Europe’s International Role”, 31 JCMS 1993, pp. 305-328; Christian W. Burckhardt, “Why is 
there a public debate about the idea of a ‘Civilian Power Europe”? EI Working Paper 
2004-02, October 2004, London School of Economics, European Institute; Christian W. 
Burckhardt, “Defining the Ideal-Type Civilian Power”, 2006; Bryan White, “Foreign Policy 
Analysis and European Foreign Policy”, FORNET Working Group I, London School of 
Economics, 7-8 November 2003; Richard Whitman, “The Fall, and Rise, of Civilian Power 
Europe?”, National Europe Center Paper, n°16, University of Westminster, 3-4 July 2002; 
Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative 
Power Europe’ ”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, June 2005, pp. 613-636.   
14   Karen Smith, “Still ’civilian power EU’?”, European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 
2005/1, London School of Economics. 
15   Karen Smith, op. cit., p. 5. Jean-Victor Louis 
  10
“Europe Puissance” which necessarily implies the possibility of using (some degree of) 
military force.  
 
Not all the writers share the idea that not only the ends but also the means are to be 
"civilian" in order for an actor to qualify as civilian power. Jan Orbie defines civilian 
power in a rather sober way “as a power that uses its resources, hard power and soft 
power, in pursuit of material goals (interests) and normative goals.”16 For some, like 
Stelios Stavridis, “thanks to the militarising of the EU, the latter may at long last act as 
a real civilian power in the world, an international force for the promotion of 
democratic principles.”17 The same author emphasises that “the EU needs to 
become a civilian power ‘by design’ rather than a mere civilian presence ‘by 
default’, as it is now the case”, and “thanks to the militarising of the EU, the latter 
may at the long last act as a real civilian power in the world: an international force 
for the promotion of democratic principles.”18  
 
The recourse to the concept of a “civilising power” proceeds from the same idea. It 
expresses, to quote an author who has intensively written on the matter, “the 
willingness to exert a form of cooperative leadership intended to civilise international 
relations”, in other terms, an “attempt to civilise the international system by 
promoting the rule of law and by strengthening international institutions and 
regimes”.19  
 
If one follows this line, what distinguishes the “civilian” power from a “military” one? It 
is the fact that the recourse to force is submitted to “stringent conditions regarding 
the use of force promoting collective security, international legitimation and 
collective implementation”.20 It has been noticed that this standpoint raises questions 
about the legitimacy of so-called “humanitarian interventions” which could imply 
apparently arbitrary decisions as far as the country and circumstances are 
                                                 
16   Q u o t e d  b y  E d i t h  V a n d e n  B r a n d e n ,  “ T h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  i n  g l o b a l  
environnmental politics: green civilian power Europe?”, Ghent University, 2006, 
www.keele.ac.uk/research/lpj/ecprsumschool/Papers/E.BrandeGnCivPower.pdf (28 
September 2006). 
17   Stelios Stavridis, “Militarising the EU: the concept of civilian power revisited”, The 
International Spectator, Rome, 2001, n° 4, pp. 43-50.  
18   Ibid., p. 50. 
19   Hanns W. Maull, research project on “Civilian Powers in International Relations: Germany, 
Japan and USA in Comparison”, www.politik.uni-trier.de/forschung/workshop/CP-RP.htm 
(28 September 2006). 
20   Maull, op.cit., p. 2. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
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concerned and apply in general to small and weak countries. Very often, the 
suspicion arises about the concealed true motives of the intervention. The right of 
“ingérence humanitaire” appears to be contrary to the prohibition of the use of 
force if it is not for self-defence or in a collective action decided under chapters VI 
and VII of the UN Charter.  
 
The Description of the “Complex and Unique” Policy Domain 
Many authors describe European foreign policy as a “system”21 and at the same 
time they underline its “fragmented” character. For example, Bryan White 
distinguishes three “forms or types of activity”:22 
1. the (economic) external relations: the EC foreign policy,  
2. the CFSP: the EU foreign policy, and 
3. the foreign policy of the member states. 
 
He rejects the view of the EU as a single actor and claims that “the EU is more 
appropriately analysed as a non-unitary or disaggregated entity in world politics”.23 
The link between member states and European policy is seen as a two-way process, 
a "reciprocal relationship".24 The main message is that European foreign policy is 
neither only shorthand for the collective foreign policy of the member states nor is it 
simply EU or EC foreign policy. Within the CFSP, the distinction is made between the 
action of the EU as a delegate of the member states and the action of the member 
states as it is coordinated under the CFSP process.  
 
Sometimes, authors add the foreign policy among the member states as a part of 
European foreign policy, the so-called “internal foreign policy”, which could seem 
paradoxical because we are speaking here of the relations with the outside world of 
an entity, the Union, with a fully fledged (EC) and emerging (EU) international 
capacity.  
 
                                                 
21    Christian Kaufholz, “Thinking Outside the Box  : The EU as a Foreign Policy System”, LES 
European Foreign Policy Conference, 2-3 July 2004. See also the references in Jordi 
Vaquer i Fanes, “Europeanisation and Foreign Policy”, Institut Universitari d’Estudis 
Europeus, Barcelona, Obs, Working Paper, n° 21, April 2001.  
22   Brian White, op.cit., p. 5. 
23  Ibid. 
24   Ben Tonra, quoted by White, op. cit., p. 16. Jean-Victor Louis 
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Some Comments on Foreign Policy Analysis 
First of all, I would like to focus on the difference between the concept of a system of 
European foreign policy and EU foreign policy. It is true that the pillar system and 
what will remain of it in the Constitutional Treaty is detrimental to the view of the EU 
as a unitary entity or as a single actor. But this cannot conceal the achievements of 
the EC/EU in the field of foreign policy. There is not only a spectacular development 
of EC external relations but also an ever-increasing development of joint or 
coordinate actions in the field of CFSP and ESDP, with its sometimes important 
failures, as in the case of the Iraq war. It must be clear, in spite of the frequent 
invocation of the merits of diversity also in this field that unilateral actions of the 
member states on the international scene in a matter declared as common interest 
are detrimental to the assertion of the EU in the world. It is contrary to its long-term 
efficiency. As Hubert Védrine, the former French Foreign Minister remarks, “although 
Europe’s international partners of course have to talk to Brussels, whether with the 
Commission or with Javier Solana ..., where and when they can also take advantage 
of the diverging positions of Britain, Germany, France or other member states by 
playing one off against the other.”25 
 
It is important for the Union to act as an entity, and the expression of this requirement 
is the attribution of legal personality, as provided for the Union as a whole in the 
Constitutional Treaty, with the classical attributes of such personality as concluding 
agreements, participating in and having a single seat in international organisations, 
developing diplomatic relations, and acceding to forms of peaceful dispute 
settlements. In order to illustrate this point, I would say that the perspective of having 
for the Union a single seat in the UN Security Council is not an impoverishment in the 
defence of our collective interest but the only way to have a coherent foreign 
policy. This objective should cease to remain a purely rhetorical formula. As a 
minimum, there should be no contradiction among EU members in the external 
expression of policy attitudes on questions of common interest. As Javier Solana 
observed in 2002: “To put it bluntly, Europe can choose to speak with a single voice, 
or Europe can decide not to be heard.”26 In October 2005, he repeated: “There is a 
compelling case for Europe to really speak with one voice so that our interlocutors 
                                                 
25   Hubert Védrine, “How others see us: Policy lessons for Europe”, Europe’s World, autumn 
2006, n° 4, pp. 14ff. 
26    Javier Solana, “Shaping an effective EU foreign policy”, Speech, Brussels, 19 February 
2002, S0025/02. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
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get a clear view of what Europe wants”.27 It is irresponsible to defend the view, as it 
has been done, that a diversity of opinions and policies at the international level 
could be a source of strength. The EU is seen as a global actor, perhaps in 
anticipation, by the outside world. Two authors do not hesitate to proclaim that “It is 
clear that, as far as the UN is concerned, the EU is in business as a single actor.”28  
 
Second, it is also clear that there are two different approaches at the basis of the 
concept of civilian power: a “realist” and a “normative” one. And this opposition 
covers different views on the possibility or the need for Europe to have a military 
capacity.  
 
For the “realists”, the EU, not being a state and depending on others for its defence, 
cannot have the military attributes of a state. It is condemned to be virtuous 
because it is weak and it will remain so. It is a view forcefully expressed some years 
ago by American neo-cons like Robert Kagan in his distinction between Mars and 
Venus, the conversion of the Europeans to Venus being a rather new factor if one 
looks at the wars of the past.29 The peace-oriented post-World War II (Western) 
Europe has replaced the Wilsonian post-World War I USA, perhaps with the same lack 
of results.  
 
For the “normative” school, the Union should not be a military power in the meaning 
of a (potentially) aggressive power (“Machtstaat”30), and it has to make the best of 
its exceptional experience of integration, projecting the vision of a Union of values on 
the external scene. But, as many authors admit, the Union as a civilian power should 
be able to use force for the defence of these values. 
 
The Union has indeed been endowed with a relatively limited military capacity. We 
are still paying the price for the failure of the European Defence Community in 1954. 
In the present situation, the EU seems to be reaching the physical limits of 
                                                 
27    Javier Solana, Speech at the inauguration of the academic year of the College of 
Europe, 19 October 2005.  
28   Kennedy Graham with Tania Felicio, “Regional Organisations and Collective Security: the 
Role of the United Nations”, in The European Union and the United Nations. Partners in 
effective Multilateralism, ISS, Chaillot Paper, June 2005, n° 78, pp. 83ff.  
29   Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, 
New York, Knopf, 2003.  
30    Adrian Hyde-Price, “The EU, Power and Coercion: From ‘Civilian’ to Civilising’ Power”, 
CIDEL Workshop, Oslo, 22-23 October 2004.  Jean-Victor Louis 
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intervention implying the possibility of the use of force. If, as Solana said in a speech 
of September 2006, “without Europe no expanded UNIFIL and without UNIFIL no hope 
for a more permanent peace”31, one has to remember that the member states have 
sent the troops to Lebanon, working under UN command. The EU is still far from 
disposing of a force of 60.000, the so-called “EU Rapid Reaction Force”. When it 
conducts a military operation, the EU has to rely on NATO capacities under the 
“Berlin Plus” arrangements. Hanns W. Maull has summed up the situation of Europe 
vis-à-vis the US in the following dramatic words: “From the beginning of the Cold War 
and beyond its demise, the US has been serving as the (free) world’s government by 
default. The EU has been acting broadly as its junior partner – no less, but also not 
much more.”32 The question is not about breaking the Atlantic Alliance but about 
rebalancing it in favour of the Union. But it is a long time ago since John Kennedy 
evoked “the two-pillar alliance”.33 And perhaps NATO is no longer the best 
framework for transatlantic cooperation, as suggested by the former Belgian 
Permanent representative, Philippe de Schoutheete.34  
 
Indeed, defence should also be a concern for the Union. To be sure the Cold War is 
over but that does not mean that there is no need for a defence policy of the Union. 
The Maastricht Treaty in article 17 §1 TEU (cf. also article I-16 §1 of the Constitutional 
Treaty), defines the CFSP as including “the progressive definition of a common 
defence policy, which could lead to a common defence, if the Council so decides”, 
a decision which would require a ratification by the member states under their 
constitutional procedures. The Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt recently supported 
the idea of a common defence in his pamphlet on “The United States of Europe”.35 
We still live in a Hobbesian world where the question raised by Stalin about the 
number of military divisions under the command of the Vatican keeps some validity.  
 
                                                 
31   Javier Solana, “Europe’s answers to global challenges”, speech, 8 September 2006, 
Copenhagen.  
32    Hanns W. Mall, “Why Europe must hang together”, in Dragons, Elephants and Tigers: 
adjusting to the new global reality, EPC, Challenge Europe Issue 15, September 2006, pp. 
84-85.  
33   Hubert Védrine, “How others see us: policy lessons for Europe”, Europe’s World, autumn 
2006, p. 18.  
34   Philippe de Schoutheete, “La cohérence par la défense. Une autre lecture de la PESD”, 
Chaillot Paper, 2004, p. 88. 
35   Guy Verhofstadt, The  United States of Europe, Federal Trust, 2005, chapter 9. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
  15
What is “European” in the EU Foreign Policy? 
 
In order to answer this question, I will rely on four documents with different legal 
status, two from the EU and two from the US. I will start with the European ones. The 
first is the Constitutional Treaty, which in its articles I-3 and III-292 lists the objectives of 
the so-called “external action” of the Union and emphasises the importance of 
values such as democracy,  the rule of law,  universali ty  and indivisibili ty  of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, the respect of human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity and, last but not least, the respect for the principles of the UN 
Charter and international law. In the same spirit, the text favours multilateral solutions 
to common problems, in particular in the UN framework. These principles, that are 
not all new in the treaties, are common to all aspects of “external action”, both EC 
and CFSP. What is new is the accent on multilateralism and the insistence on the 
importance of international law. The addition of principles that should inspire external 
action demonstrates the fundamental normative feature of EU foreign policy. It is not 
insignificant that the text was drafted by the Convention on the future of Europe at 
the time (2003) when the US invaded Iraq. 
 
The second European document is the “European Security Strategy” (ESS), with the 
revealing subtitle “A Secure Europe in a Better World”.36 The document was 
preceded by a communication of the Commission of 10 September 2003 with the 
explicit title “The European Union and the United Nations: the choice for 
multilateralism”.37 This communication pleaded for the Union to adopt a determined 
“front-runner” approach to the negotiation and implementation of important UN 
initiatives in the fields of sustainable development, poverty reduction and 
international security, taking a more active approach to the development of 
international instruments and specific EU implementation actions. 
 
The ESS was adopted on a proposal of the High Representative in December 2003, 
thus after the adoption of the draft constitution but before the end of the IGC. It 
describes among the main challenges weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and 
                                                 
36   European  Council,  European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, 
ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (28 September 2006). 
37    T h i s  d o c u m e n t  a f t e r  i t s  a p p r o v a l  b y  t h e  T r o i k a  b e c a m e  “ T h e  e n l a r g i n g  E U  a t  t h e  U N :  
Making multilateralism matter”, April 2004, www.ec.europa.eu/comm/external 
relations/library/publications06_eu-un_en.pdf (28 September 2006). Jean-Victor Louis 
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regional conflicts. This document is perfectly in line with the principles listed in the 
Constitutional Treaty. It favours an international order based on effective 
multilateralism and puts forward the objective of building a stronger international 
society, well functioning international institutions and an international order based on 
a series of rules. The same accent is set as in the Constitutional Treaty on the defence 
and development of international law and the allegiance to the UN Charter. The 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for maintaining peace and security is 
reaffirmed as well as the priority for Europe to strengthen the UN. The role of other 
international organisations is also stressed such as the WTO and the international 
financial institutions. The ESS mentions the support to new institutions like the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). It claims that democratic well-governed states are 
the best protection for our security. It emphasises the role of trade and development 
policies as powerful instruments for promoting reforms.  
 
All these points and others are typical for the objectives a civilian power is supposed 
to aim at on the international scene. It also stresses the importance of a more 
capable Europe and mentions the creation of a defence agency as a step in the 
right direction. “Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce 
duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities.”38 The 
document also notes the importance of the transatlantic alliance and it especially 
mentions the EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, which 
“enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the 
strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management”.39 
Commenting on the future European Security Strategy, a month before its final 
adoption, Javier Solana remarked:  “Europe has to be prepared to contribute 
vigorously to extending the scope of international law, to strengthening the 
institutions of World governance and to developing closer regional cooperation.”40 
 
The other two documents are both on “The National Security Strategy of the USA” 
(NSS), the first of September 2002 and the second of March 2006.41 These documents 
and more so the first one are typical of what was called American exceptionalism 
                                                 
38   European Council, European Security Strategy, op.cit., p. 12. 
39   Ibid. 
40    Javier Solana, ”The EU Security Strategy. Implications for Europe’s role in a changing 
world”, Berlin, 12 November 2003, S0230/03. 
41   For 2002 www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002, and for 2006 www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss 
/2006 (28 September 2006). EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
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and unique responsibility. The 2002 document claims for the US “a distinctly American 
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests”, a 
preference for multilateral action but a strong affirmation of the right to act alone if 
needed.42 “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the 
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise 
our right of self-defence by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent of 
doing harm against our people and our country”.43 The document is keen to extend 
the conditions for preventive action: “We must adapt the concept of eminent threat 
to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries”.44  
 
The later document includes less theory and appears less aggressive in its affirmation 
and justification of US action but the overview of America’s National Security 
Strategy starts with this unambiguous statement: “It is the policy of the US to seek and 
support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
u l t i m a t e  g o a l  o f  e n d i n g  t y r a n n y  i n  o u r  W o r l d . ” 45 This is the objective that the 
hegemonic hyperpower US assigns to itself. It includes action, if necessary military, 
against “rogue” or failed states. This vision is clearly inspired by the principles 
common to the diverse forms of neo-conservatism.46 From these principles, two are 
relevant: “A belief that American power has been and would be used for a moral 
purpose and that the US needs to remain engaged in international affairs” and 
”skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and 
institutions.”47 
 
When looking at the civilian power concept and the European documents, the 
importance of the commitment to values in foreign policy is noticeable. This feature 
is common to the US and Europe but instruments to achieve the objectives and the 
limits of military actions are very differently conceived.  
 
Of course, the strategy as expressed in the EU December 2003 document develops 
the way the member states and the institutions see the ideal configuration of the 
                                                 
42   NSS 2002, op.cit. 
43   Ibid., p. 6. 
44   Ibid., p. 15. 
45   NSS 2006, op.cit., p. 1. 
46    Quoted by Veronika Necasova, “’After the Neocons: America at the crossroads’, by 
Francis Fukuyama”, NATO Defence College, Academic Research Branch, Research Note 
n° 2, September 2006.  
47   Ibid., p.2. Jean-Victor Louis 
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Union's external action. One can discuss the conformity of all policies and actions to 
the strategy. The EU has intervened in the Kosovo conflict in the framework of NATO 
without a UN Security Council mandate. And some have found the criticism by many 
Europeans of the war in Iraq hypocritical, alleging that the EU itself is not 
irreproachable. On the other hand, the trust in multilateralism and UN action is 
considered as naïve, taking into account the difficulty to reach a unanimous vote 
among the permanent members of the Security Council. One can reply to these 
objections that the Iraq invasion by the US and the intervention during the war in 
Kosovo are not comparable, neither in scale nor in the motives invoked. The recipe 
for the paralysis of the Security Council is in the better integration of both Russia and 
China in the international system. It is not an easy task but one can view the recourse 
to negotiations as it happened, under European pressure, with Iran, as a necessary 
stage before sanctions, although a moment could come when they are 
unavoidable. One could also observe that contrary to the Europeans, the US 
government has demonstrated on several subjects (Kyoto Protocol, ICC,48 the 
attitude towards the International Court of Justice, Guantanamo, recourse to torture, 
etc.) a de facto reluctance towards international law, in conformity with its vision of 
responsibility for peace and security in the world. But perhaps pessimism is not 
allowed when thinking about the future orientation of US foreign policy. It is not far 
fetched to already notice some development. The way the US has managed the 
crises with Iran and with North Korea is encouraging whatever the motivation of such 
a relatively new approach. It is indeed possible to think that the European attitude 
has had some influence on the policy of the US government. 
 
On the other hand, it is to be hoped that the policy of the EU will remain coherent 
with the strategy it has defined. But the choice made by the Commission for 
negotiating bilateral trade agreements with India and South Korea without 
concentrating its efforts in order to give a last chance to the Doha Round within the 
WTO is not in line with its preference for multilateral solutions and the promotion of 
international institutions. The same could be said concerning the defensive and 
unimaginative attitude adopted by the EU for the reform of the international 
financial institutions. 
 
                                                 
48   On the International Criminal Court, see in particular, NSS 2002, op.cit., p. 31.  EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
  19
Conclusions: A Foreign Policy in an Enlarged Union 
 
According to Christopher Hill, “It is difficult to see how the transformation of the EU 
into a 25-member system, with at least eight states still enjoying the recovery of their 
national independence, can in the short run avoid making foreign policy 
coordination a looser and more competitive process. Indeed, there is some risk that 
in terms of international relations, the EU will become more of a framework 
organisation, like the OSCE, than the action organisation it aspires to.”49 And he 
predicted that “the almost inevitable consequence would be a strengthening of the 
tendency to form inner groups, particularly of the more powerful states.”50 
 
Too many states but also too many issues and subjects which are not of common 
interest for all the states present around the Council’s table, are problems 
accentuated by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements.51 Geoffrey Edwards also 
commented that “Most of the new Member States were very much more 
preoccupied with territorial defence and a collective memory of Soviet 
domination".52 The paucity of references to Russia in the European Security Strategy 
paper was a cause for concern since “Russia has always been the litmus test for 
Polish public opinion and politicians of European foreign policy ... It will be hard to 
convey to the Polish public that ‘the resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a 
strategic priority for Europe’, but Russia’s policy on the Caucasus is beyond the main 
scope of the ESS.”53 
 
To illustrate the multiplicity of issues that can be on the agenda of a meeting of a 
working group of the Council, Stephan Keukeleire refers to the Working Group on 
Africa of 13 September 2006: “During this meeting, the WG had to discuss: Sudan, DR 
Congo, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Somalia, Malawi, Madagascar, Togo, the progress 
report on the joint EU-Africa strategy, the EU’s concept for strengthening African 
capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the 
                                                 
49   Christopher Hill, "EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001: Renationalising or 
Regrouping ?", First annual guest lecture in the ‘Europe in the World’ series, University of 
Liverpool, 24 October 2002, pp. 27-28.  
50   Ibid. 
51   Stephan Keukeleire, “EU Core Groups: Specialisation and Division of Labour in EU Foreign 
Policy”, CEPS Working Document, n° 252, October 2006. 
52    Geoffrey Edwards, “Is There a Security Culture in the Enlarged European Union?”, The 
International Spectator, 2006, n° 3, pp. 7ff, 19-20. 
53   Ibid., quoting an article by O. Osica. Jean-Victor Louis 
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Commission Communication on Governance (as part of the EU strategy for Africa), 
and the EU Electoral Observation Programme for 2006 and 2007.”54 The danger is a 
dispersion of the actions, with both the budget and the capabilities being limited.55 
There is a risk of incoherence when so many questions have to be resolved. 
 
To face these problems, the Commission proposes some lines of action in its 
communication of June 2006 “Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for 
Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility”.56 It underlines that “the success of 
EU external action depends on three main factors: first and foremost, political 
agreement among Member States on the goals to be achieved through the EU. This 
requires a strong partnership between the EU institutions and a clear focus on a 
limited number of strategic priorities where Europe can make the difference, rather 
than dispersing the efforts across the board. This is a condition sine qua non; second, 
whether the available policy instruments are suited to the task at hand, and backed 
with the necessary resources, and present clear advantages; third, the role and the 
responsibilities of the EU institutions and the legal environment.”57 These are common 
sense ideas but not easy to put into practice. 
 
The Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht has more radical views on the subject 
which he exposed in a speech in Helsinki in 200558 and Keukeleire has made a more 
elaborated presentation of similar proposals in a contribution called “EU Core 
Groups: Specialisation and Division of Labour in EU Foreign Policy”.59 His aim is to 
avoid mutual obstruction by states having what he calls “uncommon interests”.60 He 
notices the growing irrelevance of the Council and the working groups of the 
Council and he proposes a system of core groups of three member states or more. 
Participation in these groups would have to respect the Union’s law by both, the staff 
of the High Representative and the Commissioner. Such groups would be formed for 
“the many foreign policy domains that are situated slightly lower on the international 
                                                 
54   Keukeleire, op.cit., p. 6. 
55   Edwards, op. cit., p. 22. 
56   Communication from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006, “Europe in 
the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility”, 
8 June 2006, COM(2006) 278 final. 
57   Ibid., p. 5. 
58   Karel De Gucht, ”Towards greater effect and appeal – Strengthening EU foreign policy”, 
speech in Helsinki, 27 October 2005, quoted by Keukeleire, op. cit., p. 2.  
59   Keukeleire, op.cit.  
60   Ibid., p. 3. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2007 
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agenda and that are considered of major importance by only a limited number of 
Member States”.61 They would be “created by a political agreement rather than 
through a formal legal agreement or legal mandate by the Council.”62 The groups 
cannot bind the Union as a whole and they cannot decide “when actions fall under 
the formal competences of the EC or EU” because then “the formal decision-making 
procedure should be followed.”63 This does not prevent Keukeleire from admitting the 
possibility of appeals to the Court for annulment of the acts of the core groups under 
article 230 EC Treaty, although their existence is based on a political agreement and 
are neither Union nor Community organs, and their acts are not decisions of the 
institutions, adopted under the EC Treaty, the sole acts to be possibly controlled by 
the Court under article 230 EC. Apart from these (serious) legal problems that reveal 
the true nature of these core groups as types of informal collaborations outside the 
treaty, one can ask what the contribution of these “acts” to the building of a EU 
foreign and security policy is. I would understand their intervention in the preparation 
of the deliberations of the working groups of the Council and of the Council itself, 
which is already the case but which happens quite informally with the participation 
of neither the Commission nor the High Representative. I am not convinced of the 
merits of excluding the enhanced cooperation procedure, as Keukeleire does, in 
favour of the creation of core groups.  
 
Speaking with Maull, I would say that the most promising route for Europe would be 
“assuming leadership in collective efforts to build a new sustainable order on the 
foundations of what we have today.”64 Or, as a group of economists writes in a 
paper prepared for the Finnish Presidency on “The EU and the governance of 
globalisation”: “Europeans have rarely set the agenda. They have often responded 
to new developments in a reactive manner”.65 Now “European policy makers should 
be ready to assume the responsibilities that shifting patterns of leadership may imply 
for them.”66 
                                                 
61   Ibid., p. 8-9. 
62   Ibid., p. 9.  
63   Ibid., p. 10.  
64   Hans W. Maull, ”Why Europe must hang together?”, op.cit., p. 87. 
65   Alan Ahearne, Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and Nicolas Véron, “The EU and the 
governance of globalisation”, Bruegel Working Paper, n° 2006/02, p. 31, www.bruegel.org 
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